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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (d); (f) (1953, as amended) wherein the Court of Appeals is granted appellate 
jurisdiction over "appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony." The Utah Court of Appeals also has jurisdiction 
over this matter pursuant to Rule 26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which 
provides that an appeal may be taken by the defendant from the final judgment of conviction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented by this petition and the applicable standards of appellate review 
areas follows: 
(1) Whether Utah's anti-stalking statute is constitutional, being neither overbroad 
nor vague. Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review pertaining to claimed 
violations of constitutional safeguards requires this court to review the trial court's ruling using 
a correction of error standard. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1197 (Utah 1995). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amend. I 
United States Constitution, Amend. XIV 
X 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 1 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105.5 (1953, as amended) 
The text of relevant constitutional provisions and statutes is set forth in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant Roberto Lopez was charged with Stalking, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105.5, by the second amended criminal 
information, filed September 18, 1995. Defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of 
overbreadth and vagueness was heard on October 17, 1995. The court reviewed memoranda 
and arguments of counsel, and denied the motion as to its facial attack. At trial, the court 
denied defendant's motions regarding overbreadth and vagueness as applied to defendant. 
Defendant was convicted by a jury, and sentenced to a suspended six month jail 
sentence, an $1850 fine with all but $600 suspended, twelve months of probation, and was 
required to undergo counseling. Defendant now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Guadalupe Maria Mota (Lupe) was introduced to defendant Roberto Lopez when Lupe 
was approximately thirteen years old. Record page 384, 464 (hereinafter "R.") Roberto first 
knew Lupefs uncles, then became acquainted Lupe's grandmother, who allowed him to live 
with her. R. 464-65, 480. Roberto, then approximately 25 years of age, at some time had 
previously expressed interest in a relationship with Lupe. R. 480, 483. Lupe denied any 
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interest in Roberto and rebuffed all advances. R. 419, 422, 425, 480. While Roberto 
continued to maintain contact with Lupe's grandmother and a few of her uncles, Lupe and her 
parents repudiated any attempts by Roberto to have contact with her. R. 485-86. 
Defendant had repeated notice that the Mota family wished him to have no contact with 
Lupe. R. 411, 422, 424, 466, 473. Roberto's own prior statements indicated his 
acknowledgement of the state of affairs between himself and Lupe. R. 424. At trial, the 
parties reached stipulations which were read to the jury based on prior written statements of 
Roberto Lopez. "On June 2, 1994 I went to Maria's graduation. I'm always hoping to solve 
our differences." R. 425. A second stipulation was read to the jury, acknowledging that 
prior to the time of the charged events, Roberto Lopez had been ordered by Third Circuit 
Court Judge Robin W. Reese to have no contact with Lupe Mota and her family. R. 428. A 
letter from the Motas' private attorney specifically advised the defendant to have no contact 
with Lupe and her family. R. 426-27. Lupe later observed a copy of this letter in the 
possession of her uncle who was at that time living with defendant. R. 427. 
During the period charged in the Information, the defendant engaged in the following 
conduct: 
On December 31, 1993, defendant entered a community hall where Lupe and her 
parents were attending a dance. Defendant approached Lupe dancing with a young man, and 
came to within a few feet of Lupe, looking at her dancing partner intently. Roberto said "I 
love you" to Lupe and made a motion with his hands, striking the palm of one hand with his 
fist, and then left. R. 385-86, 477. 
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Sometime during the first week of May, 1994, defendant made a u-turn and followed 
Lupe's car, from the address of 3rd West and 4th South to 3rd West and 8th South, 
maneuvering his car in front of Lupe's car twice, and constantly maintaining a close 
proximity. R. 389-91. 
On May 10, 1994, Maria was walking into West High School with Rafael Bustamonte 
and defendant approached them. Lupe told him she did not want to speak to him and hurried 
away into the school. R. 392, 431. 
On June 2, 1994, Roberto Lopez attended Lupe's high school graduation at Abravanel 
Hall, in Salt Lake City. Lupe saw him in the balcony, and Lupe's family members saw 
defendant and alerted the police. R. 393, 437-39, 444-46, 506. Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Terri Morgan was familiar with defendant, having in 1993 told Roberto to stay away from 
Lupe and specifically to stay off West High property to avoid a trespass arrest. R. 504. 
While in the Abravanel Hall security office, and while being detained on other charges, 
defendant got up out of the seat he had been placed in and was up by the monitors which 
showed the graduation. Officer Morgan observed him pressed up against and peering into the 
security monitor, and when questioned why, he responded that he was looking for Lupe and 
that he needed to find her. R. 507-08. 
On June 6, 1994, Lupe's brother Ricky saw defendant on their street, while Lupe was 
at home. R. 446-47. 
On June 9, 1994, defendant called Lupe, and she told him she did not want to talk to 
him. R. 393. 
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On June 22, 1994, defendant approached Lupe at her place of employment in the 
women's department of Sears department store, Salt Lake City, and said "youfd better talk to 
me." R. 394. Lupe ran up the escalator. Id. 
Defendant's own witnesses acknowledged that the extended family was aware that the 
Mota family told Roberto to stay away from Lupe, R. 555, 562, 579. One witness even 
acknowledged that he wished Roberto would leave her alone, and that he shouldn't call her or 
go to her house, or go places she went. R. 580. No testimony ever described any consensual 
interaction between Roberto and Lupe. R. 543, 563, 566. 
Lupe testified that she had suffered a variety of effects due to Roberto's behavior. 
Lupe had to go to counseling. R. 415. She was scared of the defendant, and afraid to trust 
people, and did not feel safe. R. 423. The victim's mother testified that her daughter didn't 
have a normal childhood. R. 474. Lupe was observed crying frequently, and asking her 
mother "Why me, Why me?" R. 475. Maria Mota testified further that her daughter was often 
unable to sleep alone due to her fear, and that she freezes and starts crying whenever she saw 
Roberto. R. 475-76. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah's anti-stalking law is neither vague nor overbroad, given its specific provisions 
requiring both a specific intent and a general intent, and due to the limiting factors present 
within the statute. Roberto Lopez intentionally or knowingly engaged in a specific course of 
conduct directed at Guadalupe Maria Mota, with the specific intent to make her think about 
him, and with the knowledge that he caused her emotional distress in doing so. 
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ARGUMENT 
Utah's anti-stalking law is constitutional, both on its face and as applied to the conduct 
of Roberto Lopez. This Court should reject appellant's argument on the following grounds, 
and affirm his conviction. 
I. UTAH CODE § 76-5-105.5, PROHIBITING "STALKING" ENJOYS 
A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF CONSTTTUTIONALITY, AND 
SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER BOTH THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
This Court must accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-105.5, and in so doing, must seek all appropriate methods to find the law to be in accord 
with Constitutional requirements. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 
1991). This court may strike down legislative enactments only where they are unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and no reasonable construction would bring the law into a 
constitutional framework. State v. Davis, 787 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah App. 1990). 
Appellant grounds his claims in the protections of both the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions. To argue for a different constitutional analysis, appellant argues only that the 
statutes should be construed differently based on their different wording, but offers no cases, 
history, or legal principles on which to base his position. Appellant does offer hypothetical 
circumstances which he alleges would justify a state constitutional interpretation more 
significant than under federal law. Brief of Appellant, page 8-11. Appellee submits this is 
inadequate to justify a divergent state constitutional analysis, and asks this Court to focus on 
federal principles only. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 989 (Utah App. 1994). 
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Appellee has attempted to discern any relevant state constitutional case law and state 
common law cases as well as those decided under federal constitutional analysis. West v. 
Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004-7 (Utah 1994). Appellee is unable to find any 
Utah cases respecting freedom of speech in a context similar to defendant's. Accordingly, 
appellee looks to state and federal cases decided under federal constitutional principles, 
particularly in regards to the due process concepts of overbreadth and vagueness. The Utah 
Supreme Court has found federal constitutional jurisprudence to be highly persuasive in 
interpreting the Utah Constitution's due process requirement. Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. 
v. Industrial Comm% 649 P.2d 33 (Utah 1982). 
H. UTAH CODE § 76-5-105.5, IS CONSTITUTIONAL AS ITS 
ELEMENTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR AND SPECIFIC TO 
DEFINE PROSCRIBED CONDUCT AND IT IS NARROWLY 
TAILORED TO SERVE ITS PURPOSE. 
Three components of the statute specifically set forth the elements of the crime of 
stalking, encompassing act, threat, and mental state components. Under § 76-5-106.5, a 
person is guilty of stalking who 
(2)(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a 
specific person . . . 
(l)(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical 
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or 
threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
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(l)(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
Parts 2(a),(b), and (c) go on to proscribe engaging in the course of conduct intentionally or 
knowingly, while having knowledge or where the perpetrator should have had knowledge that 
the conduct would induce fear or emotional distress, and where the conduct in fact induces fear 
or emotional distress. 
To be criminally liable under this statute, the defendant must have done a voluntary 
act, on at least two occasions. The kinds of prohibited behavior are clearly specified, as either 
threats, conduct which implies threats, or maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a 
specific person, or by a combination of the kinds of proscribed behavior. The threat 
component is encompassed in the definition of "course of conduct" cited above. 
The intent component is the key to Utah's anti-stalking statute, as it separates the 
behavior of innocent bystanders from those of persons whose conduct is subject to punishment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 requires two types of intent: general intent and specific intent. 
The "intentionally or knowingly" mental state of sub-part (2)(a) requires the general intent to 
do the proscribed conduct, and does not prohibit reckless or negligent conduct. 
Specific intent is required by the language of sub-part (2)(b), requiring that the actor 
has knowledge or should have knowledge of the effect of the conduct on the specific person 
targeted. 
Further, the defendant's action must actually cause the harmful result, i.e.; that the 
course of conduct induced fear or caused emotional distress in the specific person. Therefore, 
the defendant's action must be performed with two requisite mental states. 
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Section 76-5-106.5 serves a compelling government interest, and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that end. Defendant apparently challenges this statute on the grounds that it impinges on 
a fundamental right of travel, although it is unclear what his argument is. Assuming that 
defendant claims that his constitutional right of travel is affected by the prohibition on 
maintaining a physical proximity to a specific person, this Court must reject defendants claim. 
The appropriate standard for balancing government interests with fundamental rights not rising 
to the level of political free speech is unclear. State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90, 100-02 (Conn. 
Super. 1993) (citations omitted) (Connecticut anti-stalking statute held constitutional). At any 
standard, the government's interest in preventing stalking is extraordinarily compelling in 
safeguarding victims1 mental well-being, protecting citizens from the immediate consequences 
of stalking, and providing a means to intervene before the behavior escalates further. Id. As 
the Culmo court stated: 
Providing protection from stalking conduct is at the heart of the state's social 
contract with its citizens, who should be free to go about their daily business 
free of the concern that the [sic] may be the targets of systematic surveillance by 
predators who wish them ill. The freedom to go about one's daily business is 
hollow, indeed, if one's peace of mind is being destroyed, and safety 
endangered, by the threatening presence of an unwanted pursuer. 
Id. at 102. Given the nature of the governmental purposes, the means used do not overly 
infringe on constitutional rights. 
Twenty states have reviewed the issues proposed here, and upheld their stalking statutes 
against vagueness and overbreadth challenges.1 Only in Massachusetts and Kansas were the 
1
 See e.g. Boaters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1995); Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706 
(Pa. Super. 1995); Dayton v. Smith, 646 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio Mun. 1994); Foster v. Souders, 899 P.2d 733 (Or. App. 
1995); Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1995); Luplow v. State, 899 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1995); 
People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rep. 2d 422 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1994); People v. Holt, 649 N.E.2d 571 (111. App. 3rd 
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statutes stricken for constitutional defects and not restored on appeal to higher courts. 
Defendant argues in error that overbreadth and vagueness challenges are generally successful 
in striking down stalking laws. In fact, the weight of authority demonstrates that appellate 
courts are finding anti-stalking measures to be constitutional much more frequently than not. 
The cases defendant relies on are without merit. Defendant cites an unpublished 1993 
Virginia trial court decision in Commonwealth v. Camper, yet in Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 
447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. App. 1994), the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the stalking statute, 
rejecting the defendant's claim that "intending to cause emotional distress" was hopelessly 
vague. The Virginia Court of Appeals found no "substantial" interference with First 
Amendment rights, and imposed a reasonable construction on the statute, thus maintaining 
constitutionality. The Court had no difficulty with the "reasonable person" standard to judge 
emotional distress, and rejected the vagueness challenge. Id. at 535. 
Only a few states have stricken their stalking statutes on vagueness or overbreadth 
grounds, and always for reasons inapplicable here. For example, in Commonwealth v. 
Kwiatkowski, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found the term "repeatedly" was not well 
defined, rendering the statute overly vague. 647 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994). Kwiatkoski is 
inapplicable here, as it involved review of a state statute without the constitutional protections 
present in the Utah statute, and "repeatedly" is clearly defined in § 76-5-105.5. 
Dist. 1995); People v. White, 536 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. App. 1995); Robinson v. State, 456 S.E.2d 68 (Ga. App. 
1995); Snowden v. State, 611 A.2d 33 (Del. 1996); State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993); State v. 
Fonesca, 670 A.2d 1237 (R.I. 1996); State v. Lee, 917 P.2d 159 (Wash. App. 1st Div. 1996); State v. McGill, 536 
N.W.2d 89 (S.D. 1995); State v. Mattel, 902 P.2d 14 (Mont. 1995); State v.RandaU, 669 So. 2d 223 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1995); State v. Saunders, 886 P.2d 496 (Old. Cr. 1994); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. 
App. 1994. 
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Defendant's greatest reliance is placed on the views expressed in Robert P. Faulkner 
and Douglas H. Hsiao's article: And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality ofAnti-
Stalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARVARD J. ON LEGE. 1 (1993). The 
authors predicted that most anti-stalking laws would be struck down on vagueness or 
overbreadth grounds, while categorizing Utah's law as the type of law more strictly drawn 
than most, but if not vague or overbroad it would fail to encompass much unconstitutional, 
unprotected conduct. Id. at 46-50. If, indeed, Utah's law can be viewed as so narrowly 
drawn as to fail to proscribe what should be criminal conduct, then defendant is in a poor 
position to claim the law overbroad and vague. 
More recent analysis shows the state and federal courts are upholding anti-stalking 
measures challenged on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. Beth Bjerregaard reviewed all 
stalking cases decided by mid-1996, and concluded that in fact most states uphold their anti-
stalking laws. Bjerregaard, Stalking and the First Amendment: A Constitutional Analysis of 
State Stalking Laws, 32 CRIMINAL L. BULL. 307 (1996). (Addendum B). This comprehensive 
review categorizes the statutes as having varying components which serve to meet 
constitutional requirements or which allov/ a reviewing court to apply limiting constructions on 
the statutory provisions. Id. at 318, 329. Those statutes with the greatest number of limiting 
elements were predicted to be most likely to stand. Utah's law has more protections than most 
statutes, as it defines most terms, requires both general and specific intent, and uses an 
objective standard to judge to conduct at issue. Given the number of protections in the statute 
and the governmental interest at stake, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105.5 should stand in the face 
of vagueness and overbreadth challenges, as specifically outlined below. 
11 
m . § 76-5-106.5 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD, AS 
IT DOES NOT PENALIZE A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY. 
Utah's anti-stalking law is not overbroad, as it does not criminalize a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected activity. Where criminal statutes sweep within their 
coverage speech or conduct which is constitutionally protected, such laws may be found to be 
overbroad. Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). To justify striking down the law, the 
overbreadth must be not only real, but substantial, as judged in relation to the statute's 
legitimately made proscriptions. Where overbreadth exists but is not substantial, 
unconstitutional applications are to be rooted out in turn, as delineated by the factual situations 
of successive litigants. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
A. Facial overbreadth is inapplicable here. 
To invoke the doctrine of facial overbreadth, the defendant must be able to show that 
constitutionally protected speech is involved. If this court finds that a "substantial" amount of 
constitutionally protected speech is not involved, the facial overbreadth challenge cannot stand. 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982). 
Overbreadth challenges are likely to be entertained in such cases where statutes "seek to 
regulate 'only spoken words.'" Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 602 (1973), quoting 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). In addition to the speech cases, overbreadth 
might be found where statutes affecting the rights of association might result in prohibiting 
innocent associations. Broadrick, at 612. 
Neither such First Amendment right is implicated here. Utah's statute can never 
prohibit speech alone, but only proscribes speech accompanied by conduct in the nature of 
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repeatedly addressing that speech to a specific person with the intent or knowledge of 
causing that person to fear injury or suffer emotional distress. No defendant can be liable 
under this statute by the mere utterance of words. 
Even without the added protections requiring a course of conduct and specific intent 
regarding a specific person, the kinds of words uttered are not necessarily constitutionally 
protected speech. Threats have not been identified as speech "unprotected" by the First 
Amendment. See e.g., Chaplisnksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323 (1974) (libel); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement). Conveying a 
threat is already penalized by other statutes, therefore a potential defendant is unlikely to feel 
that § 76-5-106.5 has a chilling effect on one's ability to speak in a manner which is otherwise 
criminal. 
Nor does the anti-stalking statute place a burden on innocent associations which can 
raise the statute to the level of overbreadth. The statute's requirement of both general and 
specific intent that the course of conduct be directed at a specific person prevents the 
attachment of criminal liability to innocent associations. 
Because the Utah stalking statute does not significantly constrict speech or association 
rights protected by the First amendment, there is no basis to sustain a facial overbreadth 
challenge. 
Defendant lacks standing to challenge the statute on its face. In overbreadth 
challenges, a defendant may sometimes be allowed to bring his claim on behalf of others not 
before the court. However, as the United States Supreme Court has found: 
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a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to 
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied 
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court. 
Id. at 410. If this court finds that the City may constitutionally charge the defendant under 
Utah's anti-stalking law, this claim also fails. 
B. Defendant cannot meet the burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality. 
Should this Court find that First Amendment activities are affected by the Utah anti-
stalking statute, and allow a facial overbreadth challenge, the defendant must still meet the 
heavy burden of demonstrating overbreadth. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601. To overcome the 
statutes1 s presumption of constitutionality, defendant must show a "substantial" amount of 
constitutionally protected activity is proscribed by the statute. Village ofHoffinan Estates, 465 
U.S. at 494. 
In addition to showing "substantial" First Amendment interference, it is defendant's 
burden to show that no limiting construction can be placed on the statute. Broadrick, 413 U.S. 
615-16. The strong medicine of facial overbreadth is not always warranted. "[W]hatever 
overbreadth may exist should be cured by case-by-case analysis of the fact situations . . .." 
Id. Accord Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1382 (Utah App. 1990); Provo City Corp. v. 
Willden, 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989). Defendant has failed to meet this burden. Limiting 
constructions applicable here include applying a "reasonable person" standard to the emotional 
distress component. 
Utah's statute may be more restrictive than any statute yet challenged nationwide. Utah 
requires a perpetrator engaging in a course of conduct, directed at a specific victim, with that 
conduct being of such a character that it could cause reasonable fear or distress, and that 
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conduct occurs where the perpetrator has knowledge of the result as to that specific person, 
and in fact, the result of fear or distress occurs. The combination of a specific intent, general 
intent, and specific knowledge of the likelihood of producing a result serves to eliminate the 
possibility of defendants proposed overbreadth scenarios. 
C. The anti-stalking statute is constitutional as applied to defendant. 
Defendants conduct fits well within the most restrictive application of the anti-stalking 
statute. Defendant, after repeated rebuffs by Lupe and her parents, no contact orders from a 
judge, trespass warnings from a police officer, and a specific request from a private attorney, 
engaged in a course of conduct directed at or toward Lupe Mota. That course of conduct 
included keeping a physical or visual proximity, while also exhibiting intent to do this act with 
the knowledge of its effect on Lupe. Everything defendant said to Lupe during the charged 
time period demonstrated his intent to get her to interact with him, and to think about him. At 
the dance, he came close and told her he loved her. At her place of employment he said 
"[y]ou better talk to me." Defendant called the victim and wanted to talk to her. At her 
graduation he told Officer Morgan that he had to see her. 
None of these situations involved a chance encounter. None of these facts can 
demonstrate an individual engaging in speech alone. Each situation involved defendant 
purposely placing himself in a specific situation where proximity to the intended victim would 
occur, and each involves intentional communication with the knowledge of its likely result on 
Lupe. This course of conduct would cause a reasonable person the result of fear or distress, 
and defendant had full knowledge that Lupe Mota would suffer fear or distress, and that Lupe 
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did in fact suffer fear or distress. Roberto Lopez's general and specific intent while engaging 
in these acts places him well within the reach of the stalking statute. 
IV. § 76-5-106.5 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE EITHER 
FACIALLY OR AS APPLIED BECAUSE IT CLEARLY DEFINES 
PROHIBITED CONDUCT. 
After this court examines the issue of claimed overbreadth, it may turn to the claim of 
vagueness. See State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) citing Village of 
Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 at 494-95. The defendant must prove that the statute is 
"impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Id. This Court must first examine defendant's 
own conduct to determine standing to challenge the statute for vagueness. If Roberto Lopez1 s 
conduct is within the ambit of the statute, this Court cannot consider other hypothetical 
circumstances. State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 466 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant is unable to claim that the statute did not alert him that his actions were 
prohibited, therefore he cannot show that the statute is void as applied to him. Defendant's 
conduct of maintaining visual and physical proximity to Lupe Mota not only violated the anti-
stalking statute, but previous no-contact orders issued by a judge having jurisdiction over 
defendant, and an explicit letter written by the Motas' private attorney telling defendant to stay 
away. Defendant's own statements acknowledge receipt of Judge Reese's no-contact order. 
Having been trespassed from West High school, defendant went to a different location on the 
night of Lupe's graduation, and while pressed up against a t.v. monitor showing the graduation 
he admitted to a uniformed police officer that he "had to find her." 
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Defendant cannot now claim that his repeated visual and physical proximity to Maria 
were innocent accidents, or that he did not know his own conduct was prohibited. Defendant 
was told by Maria herself, by Judge Robin Reese, by attorney Richard Bigelow, and by Salt 
Lake City Police Officer Terry Morgan that Maria wanted to have absolutely no contact, and 
that any interaction between the two was harassing. Defendant was on notice that Maria 
suffered emotional distress at his presence, given that she left every time he came near, or 
called or asked for police assistance when he spoke to her. 
Assuming this Court does not reject defendant's vagueness challenge on the basis of 
standing, the court must review the vagueness claim, to determine whether an ordinarily 
intelligent person has a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited under the 
law, and that the law provides explicit standards so the statute cannot be arbitrarily or 
discriminatorily applied. Groyned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). State v. 
Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 927; State v. Davis, 787 P.2d at 519. 
Utah's statute defines the "course of conduct" and temporal requirement in clear and 
concise terms. Additionally, not only is a specific intent required, but also the attendant 
circumstances of knowledge of the result of the conduct on that specific victim. Utah's statute 
clearly explains what behavior is prohibited. Only where the prohibited conduct is 
accompanied by specific intent can stalking be charged. The specific intent requirement will 
prevent criminal liability for accidentally twice seeing the same person on the streets. 
Discriminatory enforcement is unlikely where it is the perpetrator's knowledge of the effect of 
the conduct on his victim which allows prosecution. See People v. Holt, 649 N.E.2d 571 (HI. 
App. 3rd Dist. 1995). 
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The "reasonable person" standard used here also negates any claims of vagueness. The 
prosecution must prove that a reasonable person would fear bodily injury or suffer emotional 
distress based on the defendant's course of conduct. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2)(a) (i-
ii). This objective standard eliminates subjectivity in enforcement of the law. Pallas v. State, 
636 So.2d 1358, 1361 (Fla. App. 3rd Dist. 1994); People v. Holt, 649 N.E.2d at 580. If an 
alleged victim reacts unreasonably to ordinary contact, even a person whose proximity to the 
victim is intentional will not be criminally liable under the law. State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14, 
19 (Mont. 1995). 
Utah's statute employs concrete terms, more so than many other states whose anti-
stalking statutes have been challenged. These specific terms, in addition to the reasonable 
person standard, and the specific intent requirement formulate a clear and definite law which 
an ordinary person could understand and follow. Martel and Luplow were upheld based on the 
limiting factor of the specific intent requirement. "Simply because creative minds are able to 
devise a scenario where a statute could be used to punish constitutionally protected conduct 
does not mean the 'statute reaches a substantial amount of protected activity.f" Luplow v. 
State, 897 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). 
Appellant could have understood and followed the law, if he had so desired. He 
received Judge Reese's no contact order, and all the rebuffs communicated by Lupe and her 
family and police, and in the face of that knowledge openly defied the requests and orders. 
Lupe's response was always discouraging, and yet he approached her to tell her he loved her, 
to ask her to talk, and to warn her she had better talk to him. Appellant's acts may exhibit 
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disregard for the law, but they in no way demonstrate normal acts by a person who could 
never have guessed the conduct was criminal. 
REASONS SUPPORTING ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Appellee agrees with appellant's claim that this is if one of first impression in Utah, 
and one deserving of judicial attention in order to provide guidance as to the proper application 
of the anti-stalking law. Appellee respectfully requests that this court issue a published 
opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's anti-stalking law is constitutional, and withstands both overbreadth and 
vagueness challenges. Salt Lake City respectfully requests that this court examine the law and 
determine that the its sweep (if any) of constitutionally protected behavior is not real and 
substantial enough to justify an overbreadth challenge, or that if overbroad in its scope, it is 
susceptible of a limiting construction. Salt Lake City asks this court to find that if indeed any 
impingement on liberty of movement rights implicitly protected by the First Amendment are 
impacted, that the government interest in preventing stalkers1 terrorism is compelling and 
sufficiently narrowly drawn. § 76-6-106.5 is not unconstitutionally vague, as it clearly puts 
persons of average intelligence on notice that their conduct is prohibited. None of the 
problems inherent in state statutes struck down on overbreadth or vagueness grounds are 
present in the Utah statute. Appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress snail make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce, amendment] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof; is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
8ec 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
frees, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
•ny State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
•ny State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
•hall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
tune, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof! But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
I
***d by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
S e c 6. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 1. [Inherent and Inalienable rightaj 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
riant use 
S e c 16. [Freedom of speech and of the press—LibeL] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the met ISM 
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Crime of stalking. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct1' means repeatedly maintaining 
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly 
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by 
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a 
person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, 
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household 
within the prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury 
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of 
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress; 
and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily 
injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person 
or a member of his immediate family. 
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor. 
(4) (a) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the offender 
(i) has been previously convicted of an offense of 
stalking; 
(ii) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an 
offense that is substantially similar to the offense of 
stalking; or 
(iii) has been previously convicted of any felony 
offense in Utah or of any crime in another jurisdiction 
which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in 
which the victim of the stalking or a member of the 
victim's immediate family was also a victim of the 
previous felony offense. 
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if the offender 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601 under circumstances not amounting to a viola-
tion of Subsection 76-5-103(lXa), or used other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in 
the commission of the crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of 
the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another 
jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses that are substan-
tially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any 
combination, of offenses under Subsections (5Xb) and (c); 
or 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of 
felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction 
or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be 
felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a 
victim of the previous felony offenses. isss 
ADDENDUM B 
Stalking and the First Amendment: A 
Constitutional Analysis of State Stalking 
Laws 
By Beth Bjerregaard, Ph.D.* 
This article addresses two specific constitutional issues presented 
by newly enacted antistalking statutes. Although several constitutional 
and procedural questions have been raised concerning the enforcement 
and prosecution of stalking offenses, this article will address the issues 
of vagueness and overbreadth as they apply to antistalking legislation. 
The author examines the doctrines ofvoidfor-vagueness and overbreadth 
and discusses these issues in relation to the current statutes. She then 
considers appellate court decisions that have addressed these 
constitutional questions and offers suggestions for strengthening existing 
statutes to avoid future constitutional challenges. 
Since the late 1980s and the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, 
the crime of stalking has received extensive media coverage. This at-
tention has led state legislatures to address the issue by formulating 
laws aimed at deterring stalking behaviors. The state of California en-
acted the first antistalking law in 1990 and since then all but one state 
has followed suit. 
Although little empirical data exists documenting the number of 
persons who are or have been stalking victims, the available evidence 
indicates that stalking is a serious problem. Testifying before an 
antistalking legislative hearing, Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D.Del.) reported 
that a recent survey estimated as many as 200,000 persons are stalked 
each year.1 Other sources estimate that anywhere from 5 percent to 20 
percent of all women have been victims of stalking.2 (Although stalk-
ing affects both genders, the vast majority of victims are female.3) 
* Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of North Carolina at Char-
lotte. 
The author would like to thank Katherine Jamieson for her helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this article. 
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 Antistalking Legislation: Hearing on S. 2922 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
2
 Maria Puente, "Legislators Tackling the Terror of Stalking: But Some Experts 
Say Measures are Vague," USA Today, July 21, 1992 at 9A. All Things Considered: 
News (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 29, 1992, quoted in Braulio Montesino, " Til Be 
Watching You': Strengthening the Effectiveness and Enforceability of State Anti-
stalking Statutes," 13 Loy. LAEnt. LJ 545, 546. 
3
 J. William David, "Is Pennsylvania's Stalking Law Constitutional?" 56 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. 205, 207 (1994); Kelli L. Attinello, "Anti-Stalking Legislation: A Compari-
307 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
It is also estimated that the majority of stalking victims know their 
stalkers.4 One study examines statistics from Los Angeles and concludes 
that only 17 percent of all stalking victims are celebrities.5 A large pro-
portion of stalkers are ex-lovers, ex-spouses, or estranged boyfriends/ 
girlfriends. In fact, domestic stalking represents approximately 80 per-
cent of all stalking cases.6 This is particularly troubling as a large pro-
portion of murdered women in the United States are murdered by 
domestic acquaintances.7 In fact, it is estimated that as many as 90 per-
cent of women murdered by their husbands or boyfriends were stalked 
prior to the lethal event.8 
Although few studies have been conducted examining the charac-
teristics of stalkers, it is known that a significant proportion of stalkers 
have some type of mental illness.9 While a number of emotional prob-
lems have been identified,10 no uniform system of classification has 
been developed and it is unclear which types of mental illness are most 
common or most problematic. 
The traumas suffered by stalking victims are varied. At a basic level, 
stalking evokes fear in the minds of the victims as they face the poten-
tial of physical harm from the offender. Central to the crime of stalking 
son of Traditional Remedies Available for Victims of Harassment Versus California 
Penal Code Section 646.9," 24 Pac. U 1945, 1950 (1993); Robert P. Faulkner and 
Douglas H. Hsiao, "Article: And Where You Go I'll Follow: The Constitutionality of 
Antistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation," 31 Harv. J. on Legis. 1,5 (1993); 
Robert A. Guy, Jr., "The Nature and Constitutionality of Stalking Laws," 46 Vand. 
L. Rev. 991 (1993); Silvija A. Strikis, "Stopping Stalking," 81 Geo. U 2771, 2772 
(1993). 
4
 David, supra note 3 at 207. 
5
 Puente, supra note 2. 
6
 Kathleen McClain and Jim Morrill, "Advocates' Hopes High as Stalker Bill 
Nears Approval: Measure Would Give Police Weapon in Cases," Charlotte Observer, 
June 26, 1992, at Al. 
7
 Kenneth R. Thomas, "How to Stop the Stalker: State Antistalking Laws," 29 
Crim. L. Bull. 124 (1993); Angela Browne, When Battered Women Kill (1987). 
8
 Bryant E. Poling, "Stalking: Is the Law Hiding in the Shadows of Constitution-
ality," 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 279,283 (1994); Guy, supra note 3, at 996; Thomas, supra 
note 7, at 126; Melinda Beck, "Murderous Obsession," Newsweek 60, 61 (July 13, 
1992). 
9
 Poling supra note 8, at 286; Attinello, supra note 3; Guy, supra note 3, at 995; 
Richard L. Lingg, "Stopping Stalkers: A Critical Examination of Anti-Stalking Stat-
utes," 67 St. John's L. Rev. 347,351 (1993); Melissa Perrell Phipps, "North Carolina's 
New Anti-Stalking Law: Constitutionally Sound, but Is It Really a Deterrent?" 71 
NCL.Rev. 1933, 1951(1993). 
10
 Guy, supra note 3 at 995; Karen Morin, "The Phenomenon of Stalking: Do 
Existing State Statutes Provide Adequate Protection?" 1 San Diego Just. J. 123,127-
130 (1993); Vernon J. Geberth, "Stalkers," 40 Law & Order 138-143 (Oct. 1992). 
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is the repetitive nature of the behavior, subjecting victims to prolonged 
periods of apprehension. In addition to the psychological harm suf-
fered, stalking victims are often forced to engage in numerous avoid-
ance behaviors, including changing phone numbers and even 
residences.11 
Traditionally, stalking victims have had to rely on both criminal 
and civil remedies that were woefully inadequate to address the harms 
perpetrated by the stalker's behaviors. Some of the more common civil 
remedies include obtaining a temporary restraining order or invoking 
tort remedies by suing for intentional infliction of emotional distress or 
invasion of privacy.12 Relying on civil remedies posed a number of draw-
backs for stalking victims. First, it is the victim that has the burden of 
carrying forth a successful claim in such suits, including the burden of 
proof. Victims, rather than the state, are required to devote both their 
time and money to advance their claims.13 Further, and perhaps most 
disturbing, even if the victims were successful in acquiring an injunc-
tion against the stalker, police departments were often reluctant to en-
force such orders.14 
Traditional criminal remedies were also inadequate since "stalkers 
typically engage in behaviors that are threatening to the victim, but 
which may not, absent an antistalking statute, rise to the level of a crimi-
nal violation."15 Criminal remedies were only available if the stalker 
utilized a telephone to harass his or her victim, made a criminal threat, 
or committed behaviors that rose to the level of a criminal assault.16 
Typically these statutes leave a variety of stalking behaviors untouched. 
Further, even if the stalker's behaviors were construed as criminal, law 
enforcement officers were typically reluctant to pursue these types of 
charges. When police did intervene, offenders were typically charged 
with minor offenses that did little to protect the victims.17 
11
 Poling, supra note 8, at 282. 
12
 See generally A.J.R., "A Remedial Approach to Harassment," 70 Va. L. Rev. 
507, 516-522 (1984); Attinello, supra note 3. 
13
 Ellen Sohn, "Antistalking Statutes: Do They Actually Protect Victims?" 30 
Crim. L. Bull. 203, 208-209 (1994); Thomas, supra note 7, at 128. 
14
 Sohn, supra note 13; Thomas, supra note 7, at 126-129; See also Peter Finn and 
Sarah Colson, "Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and 
Enforcement," in National Institute of Justice, Issues and Practices in Criminal Jus-
tice 2-3 (1990). 
15
 Strikis, supra note 3, at 2777; Thomas, supra note 7, at 126. 
16
 Attinello, supra note 3, at 1961-1967; Joel Fahnestock, "All Stalk and No Ac-
tion: Pending Missouri Stalking Legislation," 61 UMKC L. Rev. 783,786-790 (1993). 
17
 Fahnestock, supra note 16, at 787-789. 
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In response to these problems, states have enacted antistalking leg-
islation aimed at proscribing certain types of behaviors that previously 
were not considered to be criminal. Antistalking legislation was de-
signed to give victims legal means of protecting themselves prior to the 
actual inflicting of physical harm or violence. These statutes were de-
signed to prevent future harms by giving police the authority to inter-
vene and to make an arrest whenever an offender displays any stalking 
behavior. Generally, antistalking legislation is designed to promote the 
safety of citizens and protect basic rights to privacy. 
Since California enacted the first antistalking legislation in 1990, 
forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted antistalking 
statutes.18 Although the statutes are varied, many are patterned after the 
California legislation and most share several common features. 
Antistalking statutes require the offending behavior to be repetitive. 
Most statutes require that the harassment behaviors be accompanied by 
the specific intent to cause fear in the victim and require that the stalk-
ing behaviors objectively and subjectively result in fear or emotional 
distress in the victim. Last, a number of states require the presence of a 
credible threat before such behavior rises to the level of criminal stalking. 
18
 Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-9(M3a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.260-
11.41.270 (1993); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2923 (1995); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 
(Michie 1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); Cal. Penal Code § 
646.9 (1990 and Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-l81(c), 53a-181(d) (1992); 
Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-
5-90-16-5-93 (Michie supp. 1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); Idaho 
Code § 18-7905 (1992); 111. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-7.3, 12-7.4, 110-6.3, 3-14-5 (1992); 
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 33-1-1-35-46-1 (West Supp. 1993); Iowa Code § 708.11 (West 
Supp. 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 95-96 (1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508 (1992); La. 
Rev . Stat. Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, 121b (Supp. 1993); Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, 43 (West 1992); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.411(h), 
750.411(i) (Supp. 1993); Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-
3-107 (Supp. 1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); Mont. Code. Ann. 
§ 45-5-220 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-311.02-28-311.04 (Supp. 1992); Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 200 (1993); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NJ Stat. Ann. § 
2c: 12-10 (West Supp. 1993); NM Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3a-l-30-3a-4 (Supp. 1993); NY 
Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); NC Gen. Stat. § 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); 
ND Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211 
(Anderson 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
133.310(1993);Pa. Const. Stat. §18.2709 (1993);RIGen. Laws §§11-59-1-11-59-
3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992); SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-
19a-1-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993); Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 
1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 1061-1063 (1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-60.3 
(Michie Supp. 1992); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9a.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); W. Va. 
Code § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1993); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992); Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993); DC Code Ann. § 22-504 (1993). 
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It is important to note that there is a wide range of language among 
these statutes. Some are very narrowly drawn and apply only to clearly 
dangerous behaviors, while others are very broadly construed and po-
tentially apply to activities that may be constitutionally protected.19 For 
example, it appears that some of the statutes may be interpreted to pro-
hibit the activities of licensed private detectives, news photographers, 
reporters, and other such persons.20 Legislatures have been placed in a 
position of finding a delicate balance between legitimate public inter-
ests and the preservation of "constitutional integrity."21 
Doctrines of Void-for-Vagueness and Overbreadth 
The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth are both of 
particular relevance to the current stalking legislation and the methods 
utilized by legislatures to avoid constitutional challenges to that legis-
lation. 
Void-For-Vagueness 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the due process clauses 
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A statue is considered to be 
unconstitutional if it is so vague that "persons of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."22 
The safeguards offered by this doctrine are twofold. The first is to pro-
vide potential offenders with fair notice concerning the types of behav-
iors forbidden by the statute. The second purpose is to provide clear 
standards for enforcement of the statute in a manner that limits the dis-
cretion of law enforcement officers and court officials. In this way arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute may be avoided.23 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that these vagueness criteria 
do not impose impossible standards of specificity on legislatures.24 The 
19
 Dawn A. Morville, "Stalking Laws: Are They Solutions for More Problems?" 
71 Wash. U. LQ 921, 929 (1993). 
20
 Matthew J. Gilligan, "Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to Thwart 
Those Who Terrorize Others," 27 Ga. L. Rev. 285, 309 (1992). 
21
 Strikis, supra note 3, at 2803. 
22
 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 US 385, 391 (1926). 
23
 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US 352, 357 (1983); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 US 
451, 453 (1939); Gilligan, supra note 20, at 305. 
24
 United States v. Petrillo, 332 US 1 (1947). However, where constitutionally 
protected activity is affected, the courts may require greater precision in the statu-
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Court has agreed that almost all language is "inherently ambiguous to 
some degree"25 and that it is impossible for legislatures to anticipate all 
the potential situations or fact patterns that might emerge.26 Any unde-
fined terminology within the statutes should be understood according 
to "common meanings or through reference to legislative history or 
judicial interpretations of the provisions."27 
One particularly valuable method that legislatures have utilized to 
mitigate any vagueness challenges and to provide law enforcement and 
judicial agents with an objective method of judging the defendant's 
behavior is to impose a scienter element.28 Specific intent elements in 
antistalking legislation usually require that the actus reus be intended 
to place the victim in fear of death or serious bodily injury.29 Several 
courts including the Supreme Court, have held that specific intent re-
quirements operate to limit law enforcement discretion and narrow the 
potential reach of the statute.30 This element of the offense also oper-
tory language. See, Dean Copelan, "Comment: Is Georgia's Stalking Law Unconsti-
tutionally Vague?" 45 Mercer L. Rev. 853 (1994). 
25
 Gilligan, supra note 20, at 314; State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90, 97 (Conn. Super. 
1993). 
26
 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 110 (1972). 
27
 Attinello, supra note 3, at 1976; Strikis, supra note 3, at 2791. 
28
 Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 
1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 
& Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-181(c), 53a-181(d) (1992); Del. Code Ann. 
§ 1312(a) (1992); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-90-16-5-93 (Michie Supp. 1993); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992) (or reckless disregard); 111. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-
7.3, 12-7.4, 110-6.3, 3-14-5 (1992); Ind. Code Ann. §§33-1-1-35-46-1 (West Supp. 
1993); Iowa Code § 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 95-96 (1992); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508 (1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Md. Ann. Code 
art. § 27, 121b (Supp. 1993); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265,43 (West 1992); Miss. 
Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-311.02-28-311.04 (Supp. 1992);NHRev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-
173:7 (1993); NJ Stat. Ann. § 2c: 12-10 (West Supp. 1993); NM Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3a-
l-30-3a-4 (Supp. 1993); NY Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); NC Gen. 
Stat. § 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); Pa. 
Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993); RI Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC 
Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992); SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 
1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 
(West Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 
18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993); DC Code Ann. 
§ 22-504 (1993) (Intent or Reasonable Fear). See Appendix A for a summary of the 
state statutes and the limiting elements they employ. 
29
 However, see NJ Stat. Ann. § 2c:12-10 (West Supp. 1993) and Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993), which both require an intent to cause alarm or 
annoy. 
30
 People v. Superior Court, 250 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1988); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 US 489,499 (1982); United States v. National Dairy Prods. 
Corp., 372 US 29, 35 (1963). 
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ates as a measure of the defendant's criminality31 and ensures that de-
fendants are actually culpable of the proscribed conduct. As an element 
of the crime, specific intent is useful since it enhances the clarity of the 
legislative language and helps to avoid questions of vagueness. 
Another means of addressing vagueness within antistalking legis-
lation is to require the presence of a credible threat as an element of the 
offense.32 As with specific intent, this requirement provides enforce-
ment officials with objective guidelines to judge the defendant's be-
havior and ensures that the defendant is behaving with an intent to cause 
harm or distress to the victim.33 For example, California requires that a 
threat be made with "the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the 
threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reason-
ably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate 
family."34 Further, the threat must be against the life or be a threat to 
cause great bodily harm to the person.35 
One of the problems with the credible-threat language is that it nar-
rows the statute to such a degree that it diminishes the potential effec-
tiveness of the legislation.36 Furthermore, empirical evidence has failed 
to demonstrate an association between credible threats on the part of 
the offender and actually approaching a victim in some manner, raising 
questions about the benefits of such a requirement.37 Additionally, some 
31
 Gilligan, supra note 20, at 318. 
32
 Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 
1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 
and Supp. 1993); 111. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-7.3,12-7.4,110-6.3,3-14-5 (1992); Iowa Code 
§ 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508 (1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
14:14.2 (1992); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. § 265,43 (West 1992); Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 97-3-107 (Supp. 1993) (Mississippi does not require a threat, but allows it as a 
possible actus reus); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NM Stat. Ann. §§ 
30-3a-l-30-3a-4 (Supp. 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); RI 
Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992); 
SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-315 (Supp. 1993); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993). 
33
 Guy, supra note 3, at 1014. 
34




 Kathleen G. McAnaney, et al., "From Imprudence to Crime: Anti-Stalking Laws," 
68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 819, 886 (1993) notes that California, Rhode Island, and 
Tennessee have bills pending to eliminate this requirement. 
37
 Park Elliot Dietz, et al., "Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to 
Hollywood Celebrities," 36 J. Forensic Sci., no. 1, Jan. 1991; Park Elliot Dietz, et 
al., "Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate Letters to Members of the United 
States Congress," 36 J. Forensic Sci., no.5, Sept. 1991. 
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have criticized legislatures for focusing on explicit threats, and failing 
to protect victims from implied threats.38 
Two other methods have been used by legislatures to address vague-
ness in antistalking laws. First, statutes may state that the stalker's be-
havior must evoke a reasonable fear in the victim.39 This language 
introduces another objective standard and requires that the harm be 
judged on the basis of reasonableness. 
In addition, many states incorporate definitions of key terminology 
into their statutory schemes in order to remove any potential vague-
ness. States generally include definitions for terms such as "course of 
conduct" and "harass,"40 terms that raise the greatest opportunity for 
38
 McAnaney, et al., supra note 36, at 908. 
"Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.260-11.41.270 
(1993) (requires recklessly); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2923 (1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
18-9-111 (West 1992); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 53a-181(c), 53a-181(d) (1992); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 
16-5-90-16-5-93 (Michie Supp. 1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106.5 (Supp. 1992); Idaho 
Code § 18-7905 (1992); 111. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-7.3, 12-7.4, 110-6.3, 3-14-5 (1992); Ind. 
Code Ann. §§ 33-1-1-35-46-1 (West Supp. 1993); Iowa Code § 708.11 (West Supp. 
1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 95-96 (1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508 (1992); La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, 121b (Supp. 1993); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 265, 43 (West 1992); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.411(h), 750.41 l(i) (Supp. 
1993); Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1993); 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200 (1993); NH Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NJ Stat. Ann. § 2c:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); NM Stat. 
Ann. §§ 30-3a-l-30-3a-4 (Supp. 1993); NY Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); 
NC Gen. Stat. § 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); ND Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 
1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310 (1993); Pa. 
Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993); RI Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC 
Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992); SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 
1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West 
Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1061-
1063 (1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 9a.46.110 (West Supp. 1993); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992); Wyo. Stat. 
§ 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993); DC Code Ann. § 22-504 (1993) (requires objective standard or 
specific intent). 
40
 The following states provide definitions for the term "course of conduct": Ala. 
Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.260-11.41.270 (1993); 
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 1993); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2923 (1995); Cal. Penal 
Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 
(1992); Idaho Code § 18-7905 (1992); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 95-96 (1992): La. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, 121b (Supp. 1993); Mich. Comp. Laws 
§§ 750.411(h), 750.411(i) (Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1993); Mo. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-311.02-28-311.04 (Supp. 
1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200 (1993); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NJ Stat. 
Ann. § 2c:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); ND Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17,14-07.1 (Supp. 1993); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211 (Anderson 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West 
Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310 (1993); Pa. Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993); RI Gen. 
Laws§§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992) SD Codi-
fied Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 
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constitutional challenges. For example, the term "harass" is typically 
defined as "a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes 
substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate 
purpose."41 These terms have been constitutionally challenged in the 
past in similar statutes with somewhat mixed results.42 Several statutes 
also state that the offending acts must be committed repeatedly without 
clarifying what is meant by repeated behavior. Many statutes simply 
hold that the defendant's actions must constitute a "series of acts over a 
period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose."43 
Supp. 1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1061-1063 (1993); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.013 
(West Supp. 1992); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). The following states provide 
definitions for the term "harass": Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Ark. 
Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 1993); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 1993); 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); 
Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992); Idaho Code § 18-7905 (1992); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 
33-1-1-35-46-1 (West Supp. 1993); Iowa Code § 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 95-96 (1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, 43 (West 1992); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.411(h), 
750.411(i) (Supp. 1993); Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (Supp. 1994); Miss. Code Ann. § 
97-3-107 (Supp. 1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 28-311.02-28-311.04 (Supp. 1992); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 
(1993); NY Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 
(West Supp. 1993); RI Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. 
§ 16-3-1070 (1992); SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1061-1064(1993); 
Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). The following states define the term "follow": 
NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7(1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1061-1063(1993). 
The following states define "credible threat": Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 
1993); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-
111 (West 1992); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Iowa Code §708.11 (West Supp. 
1993); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 
1993); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NJ Stat. Ann. § 2c:12-10 (West 
Supp. 1993); NM Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3a-l-30-3a-4 (Supp. 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 
21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); RI Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); 
SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070(1992); SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-1-22-19a-7 
(Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993). Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310 
(1993) also defines without legitimate purpose. 
41
 Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992). 
42
 See State v. Zeit, 539 P2d 1130 (1975) upheld a harassment statute with intent 
to harass, annoy or alarm; State v. Meunier, 354 So. 2d 535 (1978) upholding terms 
annoy, harass, and embarrass when used in conjunction with verbs abuse, offend, 
and torment; Collection Consultants, Inc. v. State, 556 SW2d 787 (1969) upheld 
terms annoy and alarm. In contrast, People v. Norman, 703 P2d 1261, 1267 (Colo. 
1985) where term annoy was found unconstitutionally vague. 
43
 Cal. Penal Code 646.9 § (e) (1990 and Supp. 1993). See also Del. Code 
Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992); Idaho Code § 18-7905(1992); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 95-96 (1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Md. Ann. 
Code art. 27,121b (Supp. 1993); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265,43 (West 1992); Mich. 
Comp. Laws §§ 750.411(h), 750.41 l(i) (Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 
1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-311.02-
28-311.04 (Supp. 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200 (1993); NJ Stat. Ann. § 2c: 12-10 (West 
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Commentators have pointed to other terms in current antistalking 
statutes that are particularly vulnerable to vagueness challenges such 
as the "intent to annoy or alarm."44 Although one might question what 
is meant by such language, this terminology has been previously up-
held in harassment statutes.45 
Overbreadth 
In order for a law to be considered facially overbroad, it must have 
an impact on constitutionally protected activity or must "sweep within 
its coverage speech or conduct which is protected by the guarantees of 
free speech or free association."46 The Supreme Court has not recog-
nized the existence of the overbreadth doctrine "outside of the limited 
context of the First Amendment."47 Statutes that are overly broad may 
deter citizens from practicing their First Amendment rights48 and allow 
Supp. 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, 1173 (West Supp. 1993); RI Gen. Laws §§ 11-
59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992); SD Codified 
Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 
(Supp. 1993); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993). In contrast, several states ex-
plicitly define the term "repeatedly": e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 
1993) requires two or more acts separated by at least thirty-six hours but within 
one year; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 (West 1992); 111. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-7.3, 
12-7.4, 110-6.3, 3-14-5 (1992); Iowa Code § 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508 (1992); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.411(h), 750.41 l(i) (Supp. 
1993); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NM Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3a-l-
30-3a-4 (Supp. 1993); NC Gen. Stat. 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); ND Cent. Code §§ 
12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 1993); Oh. Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.211 (Anderson 1993); 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310 (1993); Pa. Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 13, 1061-1063 (1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-60.3 (Michie Supp. 1992); 
DC Code Ann. § 22-504 (1993) all require more than one act. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
947.013 (West Supp. 1992) requires actions on two or more calendar days. Other 
states fail to define the term: e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-181(c), 53a-181(d) 
(1992); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 33-1-1-35-46-1 (West. Supp. 1993); Minn. Stat. § 
609.749 (Supp. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-220 (1993); NY Penal Law § 
240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); NC Gen. Stat. § 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9a.46.110 (West 
Supp. 1993); W. Va. Code § 61-2-9a (Supp. 1993). 
44
 For example, see Sohn, supra note 13, at 229; Faulkner and Hsiao, supra note 3, 
at 24; Lingg, supra note 9, at 366; Montesino, supra note 2, at 577. 
45
 See cases cited in supra note 42. 
46
 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940). 
47
 United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 (1987). 
48
 Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F. Supp. 833, 838 (ED La. 1970). Further, John 
E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and J. Nelson Youth, Constitutional Law 722 (1978) 
explain that the overbreadth doctrine is one of the exceptions to the rule that only 
persons whose constitutional rights are personally violated have standing. With the 
overbreadth doctrine courts will strike down a statute because "it might apply to 
others not before the Court, who may engage in protected activity which the statute 
appears to outlaw." 
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law enforcement officials too much discretion, enhancing the potential 
for discriminatory or selective enforcement.49 
It is feared by some that current antistalking legislation may be over-
broad as it could apply to behaviors that might be construed as "speech" 
such as repeated written or oral communications with the victim by the 
defendant, thus infringing upon the defendant's First Amendment rights. 
However, when a statute is aimed at prohibiting conduct with an ex-
pressive content rather than pure speech, courts have been reluctant to 
apply the "strong medicine" of the overbreadth doctrine and strike down 
the entire statute.50 Stalking statutes, of course, are not aimed at "pure 
speech" but rather are concerned with the stalker's intent and conduct.51 
Several courts have already held that expressions of speech designed to 
harass a specific victim are not protected by the First Amendment.52 In 
addition, in these types of cases, where a statute is aimed at prohibiting 
conduct rather than pure speech, the Supreme Court has held that the 
overbreadth must not only be real, but also substantial before a statute 
will be declared unconstitutional.53 
Even if a defendant is successful in demonstrating that the conduct 
being proscribed takes the form of protected expression, courts have 
held that such a statute may still be constitutional. A statute may consti-
tutionally restrict expression or speech if it is proven that the statute 
serves an important or substantial state interest and is narrowly drafted 
to serve that interest.54 Stalking laws have been drafted to serve signifi-
cant and substantial state interests since these statutes provide law en-
forcement officials with the ability to intervene in dangerous situations 
before actual violence occurs and enable citizens to protect themselves 
from repeated harassment. They also provide courts with the tools to 






 David, supra note 3, at 225. 
52
 David, supra note 3, at 230. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572 
(1942) the Supreme Court acknowledged that speech that by its "very utterance in-
flicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of peace" is not protected by the 
First Amendment. Further, United States v. Lampley, 573 F2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978) 
upheld a telephone harassment statute stating that such threats were similarly not 
protected by the First Amendment. See also Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F2d 935 (5th 
Cir. 1991). 
53
 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601 (1973). 
54
 M. Katherine Boychuk, "Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Over-
broad?" 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769, 794 (1994); Faulkner and Hsiao, supra note 3, at 16. 
See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 US 367, 377 (1968). 
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There are several drafting devices that legislatures have utilized to 
protect statutes from overbreadth challenges. Probably the most com-
mon method is to explicitly exclude legitimate activities from the scope 
of the statute.55 Numerous states define harassment as conduct that 
"serves no legitimate purpose."56 North Carolina goes so far as to re-
quire that a victim inform his or her stalker that the contact is unwanted.57 
A few other states require that the conduct in question be 
nonconsensual.58 Similarly, most statutes explicitly exclude constitu-
tionally protected activities from their definitions of stalking,59 while 
55
 Id. Although this language is intended to avoid overbreadth challenges, this 
terminology has been criticized as actually adding an element of ambiguity to the 
statutes. Similarly, if one interprets the statutes literally these exclusions often apply 
only to specific sections of the statute. For example, this exclusion is often included 
in the definition of the term "harassment" and it is unclear whether or not the exclu-
sion applies similarly to the term "following." See generally Sohn, supra note 13, at 
231. 
56Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 1993); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-111 
(West 1992); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992); Ga. 
Code Ann. §§ 16-5-90-16-5-93 (Michie Supp. 1993); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106.5 
(Supp. 1992); Idaho Code § 18-7905 (1992); Iowa Code § 708.11 (West Supp. 1993); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 95-96 (1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:14.2 (1992); Mich. Comp. 
Laws §§ 750.411(h), 750.41 l(i) (Supp. 1993); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 
1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 455.010-455.085 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-311.02-
28.311-04 (Supp. 1992); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NJ Stat. 
Ann. § 2c:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); NY Penal Law 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); 
NC Gen. Stat. § 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); ND Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 
1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310(1993); 
Pa. Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993) (requires acts be without lawful authority); RI 
Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 (1992); 
SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-
17-315 (Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 
13, 1061-1063 (1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9a.46.110 (West Supp. 1993) (pro-
vides a defense for licensed detectives). 
57
 NC Gen. Stat. § 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992). Melissa Perrell Phipps, "North Carolina's 
New Anti-Stalking Law: Constitutionally Sound, but Is It Really a Deterrent?" 71 
NC L. Rev. 1933, 1945 (1993) points out that there are no other criminal statutes in 
North Carolina that utilize the phrase "reasonable warning," so this phrase has not 
yet been considered by the courts. 
58
 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-90-16-5-93 (Michie Supp. 1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200 
(1993); Or. Rev. Stat. § 133.310 (1993) (unwanted contact). 
59
 Ala. Code §§ 12a-6-90-13a-6-94 (Supp. 93); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2923 (1995); 
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 1993); Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 
1993); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992); Idaho Code 
§ 18-7905 (1992); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 13-1-1-35-46-1 (West Supp. 1993); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 95-96 (1992); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.411(h), 750.411(i) (Supp. 1993); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-107 (Supp. 1993); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.010-455.085 (1993); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-220 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-311.02-28-311.04 (Supp. 
1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200 (1993); NH Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173:1-173:7 (1993); NJ 
Stat. Ann. §2c:12-10 (West Supp. 1993); ND Cent. Code §§12.1-17,14-07.1 (Supp. 
1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1173 (West Supp. 1993); Pa. Const. Stat. § 18.2709 
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others exclude specific types of legitimate activities such as labor pick-
eting or private investigations.60 
Some states allow the defendant to raise the issue of legitimate ac-
tivity as an affirmative defense to stalking charges as a matter of law.61 
Some, however, argue that excluding "constitutionally protected ac-
tivities" opens the statutes to further vagueness challenges since the 
"average citizen is not likely to know with sufficient certainty what 
behaviors are constitutionally protected especially in the First Amend-
ment context where case law is expansive and complex."62 
Another frequently employed method of enhancing the constitu-
tionality of antistalking legislation is to proscribe only conduct that 
would cause substantial harm to an ordinary, reasonable person. This 
requirement serves to "narrow the scope of the statute and to limit its 
application only to blameworthy conduct."63 It is the harmful effect on 
the victim, not the conduct or speech, that legislatures want to prohibit. 
Requiring substantial harm also ensures that minor annoyances do not 
fall within the criminally prohibited behavior and helps to prevent arbi-
trary or discriminatory enforcement. Most statutes require both an ob-
jective standard and a subjective one that also requires that the victim 
did, in fact, suffer harm. This also helps to avoid imposing criminal 
liability upon behavior that might agitate or upset an unusually sensi-
tive or "hypercritical" individual.64 One writer points out that these re-
(1993); RI Gen. Laws §§ 11-59-1-11-59-3 (Supp. 1992); SC Code Ann. § 16-3-1070 
(1992); SD Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-19a-l-22-19a-7 (Supp. 1993); Tex. Penal 
Code Ann. § 42.07 (West Supp. 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (Supp. 1993); 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1061-1063 (1993); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.013 (West Supp. 
1992). 
60
 Cal. Penal Code § 646.9 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (labor picketing); Del. Code 
Ann. § 1312(a) (1992) (labor picketing; there is also a rebuttable presumption of no 
intent for law enforcement or private detective business); Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992) 
(picketing or other organized protests); 111. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-7.3, 12-7.4, 110-6.3, 3-
14-5 (1992) (picketing at workplace); Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (Supp. 1994) (lawful 
handbilling and picketing); NJ Stat. Ann. § 2c: 12-10 (West Supp. 1993) (organized 
group picketing); ND Cent. Code §§12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 1993) (private investi-
gators or peace officers excluded); Pa. Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993) (parties in labor 
disputes); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993) (excludes following during 
the course of lawful business activity); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9a.46.110 (West 
Supp. 1993) (excludes persons who are licensed private detectives); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 947.013 (West Supp. 1992) (peaceful picketing or patrolling, labor disputes); Wyo. 
Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp. 1993) (lawful demonstration, assembly, or picketing). 
61
 For example, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Michie 1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 508 (1992); ND Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 1993). 
62
 Sohn, supra note 13, at 231. See also Faulkner and Hsiao, supra note 3, at 28. 
63
 Gilligan, supra note 20, at 310-311. 
64
 Id. at 310. 
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quirements also bring antistalking statutes more in line with criminal 
assault statutes and thus make them more constitutionally sound.65 
A credible-threat provision also helps to mitigate overbreadth con-
cerns. Such a requirement similarly narrows the scope of the statute 
and helps ensure that only culpable behavior and not innocent activity 
is being punished. Although this may help with constitutional challenges, 
there are again several drawbacks associated with this element; notably 
a general concern that strict threat requirements may limit the effec-
tiveness of such statutes.66 Lastly, some statutes require that the stalk-
ing conduct be nonconsensual, which again limits the scope of the law 
and guards against arbitrary enforcement.67 
Antistalking statutes that are most vulnerable to overbreadth chal-
lenges fail to employ these limiting elements. Several states fail to spe-
cifically designate any particular acts as constituting the actus reus for 
stalking.68 Some legislation simply prohibits a "course of conduct"69 or 
"following" another person.70 Other problems also exist: For instance, 
some statutes specifically exclude conduct that serves no legitimate 
purpose from their definition of harassment, but fail to exclude it from 
their definition of following,71 which implies that one could be pun-
ished for following with a legitimate purpose. Most others provide no 
definition of the term "legitimate purpose," making it difficult to en-
force. Further, several statutes require only the existence of actual harm, 
seemingly applying a subjective standard of judging the harm caused 
by the defendant's conduct.72 
Overall, while some statutes appear vulnerable to constitutional 
challenges of both vagueness and overbreadth, it appears that those 
65
 Boychuk, supra note 54, at 798. 
66
 See supra notes 34-36. 
67
 See supra note 58. 
68
 See Boychuk, supra note 54, at 777; Thomas, supra note 7, at 133. 
69
 See Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.260-11.41.270 (1993); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2923 
(1995); Md. Ann. Code art. 27,121b (Supp. 1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200 (1993); ND 
Cent. Code §§ 12.1-17, 14-07.1 (Supp. 1993); Oh. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.211 
(Anderson 1993); Pa. Const. Stat. § 18.2709 (1993); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-60.3 
(Michie Supp. 1992); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.013 (West Supp. 1992). 
70
 See Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992); Del. Code Ann. § 1312(a) (1992); Idaho Code 
§ 18-7905 (1992); NY Penal Law § 240.25 (McKinney Supp. 1992); NC Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-227.3 (Supp. 1992); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9a.46.110 (West Supp. 1993). 
71
 See Sohn, supra note 13, at 231. 
72
 For example, see Florida statute, Fla. Stat. § 784.048 (1992), which states that 
harass means "to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that 
causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate pur-
pose." 
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statutes that proscribe only blameworthy conduct and take care to limit 
this conduct to only those behaviors that threaten or harass victims will 
withstand these constitutional challenges. 
Analysis of State Appellate Court Decisions 
This section analyzes thirty-five appellate court decisions that have 
addressed issues of vagueness and/or overbreadth in the antistalking 
statutes. Table 1 presents a summary of the holdings in each of these 
cases. The cases are arranged chronologically starting with the earliest 
challenges and leading up to the most recent cases. Since vagueness 
and overbreadth discussions are often commingled in the court opin-
ions, the exact basis for the court's holding is sometimes unclear. There-
fore, the table presents the basis for the courts ruling for both 
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth challenges together as well as the 
rationales behind the decisions. 
For vagueness challenges, the exact terminology that was challenged 
is presented. For overbreadth challenges, several issues are examined; 
whether the courts determined if constitutionally protected activity was 
implicated by the statutes, whether the overbreadth was substantial, and 
whether states had compelling interests that were served by the 
antistalking legislation. The last column of the table indicates whether 
the courts recognized any of the limiting elements in these statutes as 
important in deciding constitutional challenges of both vagueness and/ 
or overbreadth. 
Vagueness Challenges 
The constitutionality of an antistalking statue was first challenged 
at the appellate court level in 1993, when the Superior Court of Con-
necticut held that their antistalking statute was not void for vagueness.73 
Since that time, the overwhelming majority of cases have held that these 
statutes are not constitutionally vague. 
Although a variety of terms and phrases have been addressed by the 
courts, the term "repeatedly" has been subjected to the greatest number 
of challenges. Almost all of the courts have held that this term is not 
vague. In fact in State v. Saunders,14 the court held that the term added 
to the specific intent requirement and helped to narrow the range of 
73
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993). 
74
 State v. Saunders, 886 P2d 496, 497 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 
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Table 1: Summary of State Appellate Court Decisions Analyzing Antistalking Statutes 
Case 
State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 
(Conn. Super. 1993) 
Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 
(Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1994) 
(Aggravated Stalking) 
People v. Krawiec, 634 NE 1173 
| (111. App. 2 Dist. 1994) 
People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
1 422 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994) 
Pallas v. Slate, 636 So. 2d 1358 
(F la .App.3DisLl994) 
1 (Aggravated Stalking) 
Varney v. State, 638 So. 2d 1063 
1 (Fla. App. 1994) 
Gilbert v. State. 639 So. 2d 191 
(Fla. App. 1994) (Aggravated 
J Stalking) 
1 Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 
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State v. Kahles, 644 So. 2d 512 
1 (Fla. App. 1994) 
Rosen v. State, 644 So. 2d 531 
















































Johnson v. State, 449 SE2d 94 
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Dayton v. Smith, 
1 656 NE2d 917 (1994) 
Salantino v. State, 
644 So. 2d 1035 (Ha. App. 1994) 
(Aggravated) 
State v. Saunders, 886 P2d 496 
(Okla. Crim App. 1994) 
1 State v. Bilder, 
1 99 Ohio App. 2d 653 (1994) 
Robinson v. State, 456 SE2d 68 
J (Ga. App. 1995) 
Johnson v. State, 648 Nl£2d 666 
|(Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1995) 
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State v. Cooney, 894 P2d 303 
1 (Mont. 1995) 
Koshel v. State, 659 So. 2d 232 
1 (1995); 1995 Fla. LEXIS 623 
Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235 
((1995); 1995 Fla. LEXIS 624 
1 State v. Norris Roinine, 
J 894 P2d 1221 (Or. App. 1995) 
Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 
(Wyo. 1995) 
Foster v. Souders, 899 P2d 733 
(Or. App. 1995) 
People v. White, 536 NW2d 876; 



































































State v. Eccles, 
136 Ot App. 30 (1995) 733 
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1995 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 139 
State v. McGill, 536 NW2d 89 
(SD 1995) 
People v. Carron, 
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 (Cal. App. 
2 Dist. 1995) (Not an Overbreadth 
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Montana v. Martel, 
1995 Mont. LEXIS 188 
State v. Dario, 
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CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
police discretion. Perhaps the court in State v. Culmo15 expressed it best 
when it stated that "acting 'repeatedly' in the context of the statute 
means precisely what the commonly approved usage of the word sug-
gests—acting on more than one occasion." 
However, this is one of the few areas where courts have disagreed. 
In Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski™ the court ruled that the harassment 
section of Massachusetts's stalking statute was unconstitutionally vague. 
That court reasoned that the statute, as designed, could be interpreted to 
require proof of "repeated, rather than single, patterns of conduct or 
series of acts."77 It concluded by stating that in the future the word "re-
peatedly" should be removed from the harassment portion of the stat-
ute.78 The justices ruled that in the future the legislation should be 
reworded to state that "a person shall be guilty of stalking due to ha-
rassment if that person willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing 
pattern of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a 
specific person.... "79 
The other expression that has drawn diverse court opinions is the 
phrase "without legitimate purpose." As noted earlier, scholars have 
questioned the efficacy of adding this phrase to stalking statutes given 
the definitional vagaries of "legitimate purpose." Accordingly, the Or-
egon Court of Appeals, in State v. Eccles*0 agreed that this phrase is 
vague. However, the Oregon court was not judging the constitutional-
ity of Oregon's antistalking statute, but rather the validity of a stalking 
protection order. 
In May 1995, this same court, specifically analyzing the state's 
antistalking statute, again held that this term was unconstitutionally 
vague.81 The rationale for this decision rested on the court's assumption 
that an ordinary person would not be able to understand this term with-
out reference to the legislative history of the statute.82 Two months later, 
75
 642 A2d 90, at 98. 
76
 Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 647 NE 854, 854 (Mass. 1994). 
77
 Id. at 854. Section 43(d) of the Massachusetts code stated that "For the pur-
poses of this section, 'harass' means a knowing and willful pattern of conduct or 
series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific person, which seriously 
alarms or annoys the person. Said conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable 
person to suffer substantial emotional distress." 
78
 Id. at 855. 
79
 Id. at 858. 
80
 State v. Eccles, 136 Or. App. 30, 36 (1995). 
81
 State v. Norris-Romine, 894 p2d 1221 (Or. App. 1995). 
82
 Id. at 1224. 
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in July 1995, the court inexplicably overruled it prior holding and con-
cluded that this phrase was not vague.83 Although the court ruled in the 
state's favor, Judge Landau, in his concurrence, stated that he is reluc-
tant to acknowledge that citizens have full knowledge of the legislative 
history of statutes. Instead he affirmed his belief that vagueness chal-
lenges should determine whether a statute "is sufficiently explicit to 
inform persons of common intelligence of the conduct they must 
avoid."84 The Florida Court of Appeals reached a similar decision up-
holding this phrase the prior year."85 
Several other terms and phrases have endured constitutional chal-
lenges. The word "harass" has been addressed by four appellate courts 
and all have held that the term was not vague.86 Likewise, the phrase 
"pattern of conduct" has also been examined by four appellate courts 
that concluded that this phraseology was not unconstitutionally vague.87 
Several of these holdings emphasized other limiting elements present 
in the statutes. For example, Luplow v. State highlighted the fact that 
the statute in question also required specific intent and had an objective 
standard for judging the substantial harm required.88 Similarly, Mon-
tana v. Martel asserted that the specific intent requirement protected 
the statute against a charge of vagueness.89 
In addition, several courts have held that the "intent to cause emotional 
distress" was not vague90 and other terms such as "willfully,"91 "lying in 
wait,"92 "maliciously,"93 and "contact"94 have been declared constitutional. 
83
 Foster v. Souders, 899 P2d 733 (Or. App. 1995). 
84
 Id. at 734. 
85
 Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1994). 
86
 Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1994); Pallas v. State, 636 
So. 2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Montana v. Martel, 902 P2d 14 (1995); Luplow 
v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). 
87
 State v. Dario, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4031 (Sept. 20,1995); Dayton v. Smith, 
646 NE2d 917 (1994); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995); State v. Randall, 
1995 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 324 (Sept. 29, 1995). 
88
 Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463, 468 (Wyo. 1995). 
89
 Montana v. Martel, 902 P2d 14, 20 (Mont. 1995). 
90
 Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 SE2d 530 (Va. App. 1994); Montana v. Martel, 
902 P2d 14 (Mont. 1995); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). 
91
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993); Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d 
156 (Ala. 1995). 
92
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993). 
93
 Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1995); State v. McGill, 536 NW2d 89 
(SD 1995). 
94
 Robinson v. State, 456 SE2d 68 (Ga. App. 1995). 
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The overwhelming conclusion to be drawn from the vagueness chal-
lenges is that antistalking statutes are not unconstitutionally vague, es-
pecially when the statute includes limiting elements such as specific 
intent, an objective standard of harm, or when the statute defines key 
terminology. Since many of these terms have been previously chal-
lenged and upheld in other contexts,95 these results are not unexpected. 
Overbreadth Challenges 
Defendants have been far less successful in challenging antistalking 
statutes for overbreadth. In fact, none of the appellate courts analyzed 
has held that an antistalking statute was overbroad. The rationales for 
these decisions are remarkably similar. 
At a basic level, the majority of courts examining this issue simply 
failed to recognize that these statutes implicate any First Amendment 
constitutional rights,96 acknowledging that the statutes are prohibiting 
conduct, not speech.97 Similarly, courts that have not reached this con-
clusion have still held that these statutes fail to reach a substantial amount 
of constitutionally protected activity.98 
Further, courts have long held that even if expressive conduct is 
being forbidden by a statute, states have the authority to regulate harm-
ful conduct if the laws are narrowly drawn to reflect a legitimate state 
interest.99 Claims of overbreadth must be judged in relation to the 
statute's legitimate scope. In other words, the courts will balance the 
states' interests in drafting such statutes against the constitutional rights 
of defendants. Statutes that are exclusively drafted to serve important 
state interests such as preventing harmful conduct, protecting citizens, 
and deterring stalkers will be given more latitude. 
95
 See supra note 42. 
96
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993); Montana v. Martel, 902 P2d 
14 (Mont. 1995); State v. Dario, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4031 (Sept. 20, 1995); 
Dayton v. Smith, 646 NE2d 917 (1994); State v. Bilder, 99 Ohio App. 2d 653 (1994); 
People v. Holt, 649 NE2d 571 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1995); People v. Holt, 649 NE2d 571 
(111. App. 3 Dist. 1995); State v. Cooney, 894 P2d 303 (Mont. 1995); Bouters v. State, 
634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1994); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995); 
People v. White, 536 NW2d 876; (Mich. 1995). 
97
 Montana v. Martel, 902 P2d 14, 20 (Mont. 1995). 
98
 Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Woolfolk v. 
Coomonwealth, 447 SE2d 530 (Va. App. 1994); Johnson v. State, 449 SE2d 94 (Ga. 
1994); Dayton v. Smith, 646 NE2d 917 (1994). 
99
 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 613-615 (1973). 
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Several appellate courts have expressly held that there is a compel-
ling interest being served by these statutes.100 Most notably, the statutes 
seek to protect citizens and to prevent the fear and the potential for 
violence associated with stalking behaviors.101 Further, these statutes 
provide a tool for law enforcement officials to intervene, to prevent 
violence,102 and to deter harmful conduct.103 Last, and perhaps most 
important, antistalking statutes protect "the mental well-being of the 
victim."104 
The elements of specific intent105 and the presence of an objective 
standard of harm106 have been recognized most often as allowing stat-
utes to avoid both vagueness and overbreadth challenges. Both ele-
ments help to ensure that only conduct intended to cause harm is 
proscribed by the statute. Similarly, a "reasonable person" standard helps 
reassure that discretion is removed from both the enforcement official 
100
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993); People v. Krawiec, 634 NE 
1173 (111. App. 2 Dist. 1994); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 SE2d 530 (Va. App. 
1994); People v. Carron, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1995); Montana v. 
Martel, 902 P2d 14 (Mont. 1995); State v. Dario, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4031; 
(Sept. 20, 1995); State v. Bilder, 99 Ohio App. 2d 653 (1994); People v. Holt, 649 
NE2d 571 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1995); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). 
101
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90,95 (Conn. Super. 1993); State v. Dario, 1995 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4031 at 11 (Sept. 20,1995); People v. Krawiec, 634 NE 1173, 1179 (111. 
App. 2 Dist. 1994); People v. Holt, 649 NE 2d 571, 576 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1995). 
102
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90, 95 (Conn. Super. 1993). 
103
 Montana v. Martel, 902 P2d 14,20 (Mont. 1995); State v. Bilder, 99 Ohio App. 
2d 653, 663 (1994). 
104
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90,95 (Conn. Super. 1993); State v. Dario, 1995 Ohio 
App. LEXIS 4031 at 11 (Sept. 20, 1995). In fact, in Culmo at 101-102, the court 
stated that "the freedom to go about one's daily business is hollow, indeed, if one's 
peace of mind is being destroyed, and safety endangered, by the presence of an 
unwanted pursuer." 
105
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993); People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 422 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1994); Champagne v. Gintick, 871 F. Supp. 1527 (D. 
Conn. 1994); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 SW2d 530 (Va. App. 1994); Culbreath 
v. State, 667 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1995); Montana v. Martel, 902 P2d 14 (Mont. 1995); 
State v. Dario, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4031 (Sept. 20, 1995); Johnson v. State, 449 
SE2d 94 (Ga. 1994); State v. Saunders, 886 P2d 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Johnson 
v. State, 648 NE2d 666 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1995); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 
(Wyo. 1995). In contrast, the court in Dayton v. Smith, 646 NE2d 917, 919 (1994) 
explicitly stated that specific intent was not necessary to survive a constitutional 
challenge. 
106
 State v. Culmo, 642 A2d 90 (Conn. Super. 1993); Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 
1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 SE2d 530 (Va. App. 
1994); People v. Carron, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 328 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1995); Montana v. 
Martel, 902P2d 14 (Mont. 1995); Johnson v. State, 449 SE2d94 (Ga. 1994); Johnson 
v. State, 648 NE2d 666 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1995); People v. Holt, 649 NE2d 571 (111. 
App. 3 Dist. 1995); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995); People v. White, 536 
NW2d 876; (Mich. 1995). 
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and the victim and that the defendant's conduct is judged from an ob-
jective standpoint. 
Appellate courts have also stressed the importance of excluding 
constitutionally protected activities from the reach of the statute.107 Stat-
utes that explicitly exclude activities conducted with a legitimate pur-
pose are stronger in the face of constitutional challenges.108 Last, a few 
courts have supported the addition of credible-threat109 and substan-
tial-harm110 requirements. These elements operate to assure that only 
conduct that presents a serious threat of harm to the victim is 
criminalized. 
In conclusion, the appellate courts have been overwhelmingly sup-
portive of the state's authority to proscribe stalking behaviors. Legisla-
tion that prohibits this type of conduct has not been found to substantially 
threaten citizens' First Amendment freedoms. Furthermore, those stat-
utes that have been challenged were constructed in such a manner that 
they also protect defendant's constitutional rights by punishing only 
culpable or blameworthy conduct. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
It appears that most of the newly enacted antistalking statutes will 
survive First Amendment constitutional challenges. Thus far the courts 
have been very supportive of the efforts of states to address the wrench-
ing problems associated with stalking. However, it does appear that 
there are some statutes that may be vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
Specifically, legislation that fails to employ any of the limiting ele-
ments recognized by the courts may be most vulnerable to challenge. It 
appears that the constitutional flaws that exist in these statutes are "pri-
marily a result of the hasty and highly politicized manner in which 
107
 Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); People v. Holt, 649 
NE2d 571 (111. App. 3 Dist. 1995); Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 
1994); Luplow v. State, 897 P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995); People v. White, 536 NW2d 876 
(Mich. 1995). 
108
 Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Woolfolk v. Com-
monwealth, 447 SE2d 530 (Va. App. 1994); People v. Holt, 649 NE2d 571 (111. App. 
3Dist. 1995); People v.Holt, 649 NE2d 571 (HI. App. 3 Dist. 1995); Bouters v. State, 634 
So. 2d 246 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1994); People v. White, 536 NW2d 876 (Mich. 1995). 
109
 Culbreath v. State, 667 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1995); Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 
246 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1994); People v. White, 536 NW2d 876 (Mich. 1995). 
110
 Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994); Luplow v. State, 897 
P2d 463 (Wyo. 1995). However, the court in Johnson v. State, 449 SE2d 94,96 (Ga. 
1994) held that Georgia's statute was acceptable without an overt threat require-
ment. 
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these laws were enacted rather than from any inherent constitutional 
protection for true stalking behavior."111 
In analyzing both the statutes and the cases addressing these laws, 
there are several recommendations that can be made to help statutes 
avoid constitutional attacks. These suggestions are designed to both 
enhance the constitutionality of the statutes and expand their effective-
ness: 
1. Require specific intent on behalf of the defendant. This will guard 
against both vagueness and overbreadth challenges. 
2. Employ both an objective and subjective standard for determin-
ing harm. This will ensure that defendants will not be punished 
because they encounter "overly sensitive" victims or encounter 
law enforcement officials who must rely on their own judgments 
to enforce the statute. It will also ensure that only conduct that 
actually causes fear in the victim will be criminalized. 
3. Explicitly exclude constitutionally protected activity, especially 
activity protected by the First Amendment. 
4. Require that the actus reus be committed without legitimate 
purpose; allow exceptions for persons with lawful objective such 
as those who are involved in labor disputes, private detectives, 
media personnel on the job, etc. 
5. When excluding constitutionally protected activities or those 
conducted with a legitimate purpose, make it clear that these 
exclusions apply to all portions of the statute and not just to 
specific terms such as "harassment" or "course of conduct." 
6. Define key terminology in the statute, especially language as-
sociated with the actus reus, to avoid vagueness claims. 
7. It does not appear that a threat requirement is necessary to avoid 
constitutional challenges. However, if a statute does require the 
presence of a credible threat, then the coverage should be ex-
panded to include threats against family members or other per-
sons as well as implied threats. 
Given the present case analysis, statutes that incorporate these ele-
ments should be constitutionally sound. This will allow states to pursue 
the worthy goal of protecting stalking victims while simultaneously 
ensuring that the constitutional rights of citizens are being upheld. 
111
 Faulkner and Hsiao, supra note 3, at 61-62. 
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